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Zero-Bias Deep Learning for Accurate Identification
of Internet of Things (IoT) Devices
Yongxin Liu, Jian Wang, Jianqiang Li, Houbing Song, Senior Member, IEEE, Thomas Yang, Senior
Member, IEEE, Shuteng Niu and Zhong Ming

Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) provides applications
and services that would otherwise not be possible. However,
the open nature of IoT make it vulnerable to cybersecurity
threats. Especially, identity spoofing attacks, where an adversary
passively listens to existing radio communications and then mimic
the identity of legitimate devices to conduct malicious activities.
Existing solutions employ cryptographic signatures to verify
the trustworthiness of received information. In prevalent IoT,
secret keys for cryptography can potentially be disclosed and
disable the verification mechanism. Non-cryptographic device
verification is needed to ensure trustworthy IoT. In this paper,
we propose an enhanced deep learning framework for IoT device
identification using physical layer signals. Specifically, we enable
our framework to report unseen IoT devices and introduce the
zero-bias layer to deep neural networks to increase robustness
and interpretability. We have evaluated the effectiveness of the
proposed framework using real data from ADS-B (Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast), an application of IoT in
aviation. The proposed framework has the potential to be applied
to accurate identification of IoT devices in a variety of IoT
applications and services. Codes and data are available in [1].
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Cybersecurity, Big Data
Analytics, Non-cryptographic identification, Zero-bias Neural
Network, Deep Learning.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is characterized by the interconnection and interaction of smart objects (objects or devices
with embedded sensors, onboard data processing capability,
and a means of communication) to provide applications and
services that would otherwise not be possible [2]. The convergence of sensor, actuator, information, and communication
technologies in IoT produces massive amounts of data that
need to be sifted through to facilitate reasonably accurate
decision-making and control [3]. Big data analytics has the
potential to enable the move from IoT to real-time control
[4]. However, due to the open nature of IoT, IoT is subject
to cybersecurity threats [5], [6]. One typical cybersecurity
threat is identity spoofing attacks where an adversary passively
collect information and then mimic the identity of legitimate
devices to send fake information or conduct other malicious
activities. Such attacks can be extremely dangerous when
appear in critical infrastructures [7].
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Conventional approaches to prevent identity spoofing attacks employ cryptographic algorithms to verify that a trusted
source generates a message. However, the cryptographic approaches depend on the secrecy of encryption keys and encounter challenges from the open and heterogeneous ecosystems of IoT. For example, a number of commercially successful IoT systems, which do not operate with cryptographic
keys, require a huge investment to become cryptographically
secure [8]. Therefore, there is a need for non-cryptographic
solutions to verify the identify of IoT devices, thus ensuring
trustworthy IoT.
Non-cryptographic IoT device identification is inspired by
signal identification technology in speech and acoustic signal
processing [9]. The assumption is that each each signal source
modulate its unique features into the propagated signals.
Comparably, in non-cryptographic IoT device identification,
we assume that each wireless transmitter randomly picks up
certain types of imperfectness (a.k.a, radiometric fingerprint)
during their manufacture [10] and could be reflected in the
demodulated signals. Existing works on non-cryptographic
device identification can be classified into two categories:
specific feature recognition and deep learning. Specific featurebased approaches focus on deriving distinctive features (a.k.a,
transmitter fingerprints) from received signals [11], [12] to
recognize known devices. Deep learning based approaches
do not require knowing devices’ radiometric characteristics
and shows even higher accuracy [13], [14]. However, the
challenge of applying deep learning approaches for IoT device
identification lies in two aspects: unseen device recognition,
and model interpretability. The first challenge requires deep
neural networks to report unseen devices rather than erroneously associating them with known ones. The second
challenge requires that the behaviors of neural networks to
be interpretable.
In this paper, we propose an enhanced deep learning
framework for accurate and interpretable identification of
IoT devices with mathematically assured performance. We
propose a zero-bias dense layer for Deep Neural Networks
to jointly verify known devices and identify unknown ones.
The effectiveness of the proposed framework in handling
massive signal recognition and improving the performance
of traditional neural networks has been demonstrated. The
contributions of this paper are as follow:
• We provide a novel enhancement, the zero-bias layer,
to replace the last dense layer in conventional neural
networks to increase its interpretability without losing
accuracy.
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We provide a novel technique to characterize how well a
neural network can distinguish from different classes.
• We enable our framework to automatically report unknown devices rather than erroneously associating them
with known ones.
Our research offers not only a solution to accurate identification of IoT devices, thus useful in promoting trustworthy
IoT, but also a deep learning framework for intrusion detection. In addition, the introduction of zero-bias layer in deep
neural networks represents an advance in deep learning, thus
leveraging deep learning to enable the move from IoT to realtime control.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A
literature review of non-cryptographic device identification
is presented in Section II. We formulate our problem in
Section III with methodology presented in Section IV. Performance evaluation is presented in Section V with conclusions
in Section VI.
•

II. R ELATED WORKS
Non-cryptographic device identification is emerging as a solution to Physical layer security of IoT. Coresponding methods
can be classified into two categories: specific feature based and
deep learning based.
A. Specific feature based approaches
The specific feature based approaches require human efforts
to discover distinctive features for device identification. The
methods rely on the fact that there are various manufacturing
imperfectnesses in wireless devices’ RF frontends. These
imperfectnesses do not degrade the communication quality but
can be exploited to identify each transmitter uniquely. Those
features are named Physical Unclonable Features (PUF) [15],
[16]). There are two categories of PUFs: error pattern and
transient patterns.
In error pattern approaches, it is assumed that the statistical
properties of received symbols’ noise could uniquely profile
wireless devices. In [17], the authors show that phrase error
of Phase Lock Loop in transmitters can provide promising
results even with low Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). In [18],
the authors use the difference between received signals and
theoretical templates to construct error vectors. Error vectors’
statistics and time-frequency features are combined as fingerprints for transmitter identification. In [19], the authors employ
differential constellation trace figure (DCTF) to capture the
time-varying modulation error of Zigbee devices. They then
develop their low-overhead classifier to identify 54 Zigbee
devices.
In transient pattern approaches, it is assumed that a malicious entity can not forge the transient response characteristic
of wireless transmitters [20]. Transient patterns are commonly
seen at the beginning and end of wireless packet transmission.
In [21], nonlinear in-band distortion and spectral regrowth of
the signals are utilized to distinguish the masquerade emitter.
In [22], the authors employ the transient energy spectrum on
transmitters’ turn-on amplitude envelops to identify, and they
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show that frequency-domain features outperform time-domain
features.
Feature-based approaches require efforts to manually extract
features or high-order statistics for different scenario. Therefore, more effortless and versatile methods are required.
B. Deep neural network based approaches
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are frequently used as a
general-purpose BlackBox for pattern recognition. Naturally,
they are applied to perform device-specific identification.
A typical DNN enabled wireless device identification system employs convolutional layers to extract latent features.
Convolutional layers apply filters (a.k.a., kernels) to obtain
helpful information automatically. Such benefit reduces the
hardship of manual feature discovery. In [23], the authors
provide a novel method that perform the signal denoising
and emitter identification simultaneously using an autoencoder
and a Convolution Neural Network (CNN). Their solution
shows promising results even with low SNR. Similar work
in [24] employs stacked denoising auto-encoder and show
similar results. DNNs perform well even on raw signals. In
[25], the authors provide an optimized Deep Convolutional
Neural Network to classify SDR-based emitters in 802.11AC
channels, they show that, even by using raw signals without
feature engineering, CNN surpasses the best performance
of conventional statistical learning methods. In [26], neural
networks were trained on raw IQ samples using the open
dataset1 from CorteXlab. Their work also show similar results.
Compare with specific feature based approach, deep neural networks dramatically reduce the requirement of domain
knowledge and the quality of fingerprints.
In general, DNNs are becoming a promising building block
in non-cryptographic wireless device identification. DNNs
encounter a challenge in terms of anomaly detection, which
requires that deep learning enabled identification systems not
only to perform well on trained objects but also can report
unknown objects that it would make a wrong decision. Furthermore, for dependable machine learning in practical scenarios,
we need to understand how a neural network associates an
input with a corresponding label. These two aspects are rarely
covered in signal identification, thus motivating our research.
III. P ROBLEM DEFINITION
In this research, we focus on deriving protocol-agnostic
solution to identify of IoT devices from physical layer signals.
The reason is that signal features directly correspond to
hardware components and reveals the identities of IoT devices.
We define that an IoT device i transmits specific message
with corresponding baseband signal mi (t). mi (t) is modulated
into:
Mi (t) = Ci [mi (t)]
(1)
Where Ci (x) denotes the frequency band processing chains.
At receiver j, the received signal becomes:
Rij (t) = Sij [Mi (t)]
1 https://wiki.cortexlab.fr/doku.php?id=tx-id

(2)
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Where Sij denotes the effect of wireless channel between i
and j. This function can incorporate the effect of attenuation
or additive noise. The demodulated signal is:

0.3
Pesudo noise
Baseband signals
Medoids

0.2
0.1

m̂i (t) = Sj−1 {Cj−1 [Rij (t)]}

(3)

= Sj−1 {Cj−1 [Sij [Ci [mi (t)]]]}
Cj−1 (x)

-0.1
50

Sj−1 (x)

where
and
are js estimated reverse function
of Ci (x) and Sij , respectively. The estimation can hardly be
idealistic. Therefore, at the receiver side, j, the effect of such
discrepancies are reflected in m̂i (t) as:
m̂j (t) = ri (t) + δj (t)

IV. P ROPOSED F RAMEWORK
In this section, we first present the feature extraction methods and then introduce the zero-bias deep learning framework
for accurate and interpretable identification of IoT devices.
A. Baseband demodulation
In this research, we use an independent Software-Defined
Radio (SDR) receivers, denoted as j 0 , to collect baseband
signals from wireless transmitters, denoted as m̂j 0 (t). Given
input signal x, the quadrature demodulation function is defined
as:
(5)

= LP F [x · cos(ωc t + φ0 ) + i · x · sin(ωc t + φ0 )]
where I(t) and Q(t) are In-Phase and Quadrature components, respectively. ωc and φ0 are the center frequency and
the phase offset of the receiver (j 0 ), respectively. i denotes
the imaginary part of complex function. With Phase Lock
Loop (PLL), ωc and φ0 are supposed to be sufficiently close to
RF characteristics of device i. LP F denotes a low-pass filter.
Therefore, at j 0 , demodulated baseband is:
m̂j 0 (t) = Cj−1
0 [Rij 0 (t)]

100

150

200

250

300

(a) Noise extraction on typical signals.

(4)

where ri (t) is directly correlated with mi (t) while the residual,
δj (t), is utilized to recognize a wireless device. As long as
δj (t) is uncorrelated with messages mi (t), the recognition
algorithm is protocol-agnostic. Apparently, this is a classification problem, to avoid the hardship of feature engineering,
we use DNN and convert IoT device recognition problem into
3 subproblems:
1) Given message-related baseband signals from various
wireless transmitters, how to extract message-independent
components to develop a classifier using DNNs?
2) How to enable our classifier to properly respond to unseen
signals?
3) How can we evaluate the distinguisability between different devices?

Cj−1
0 (x) = I(t) + i · Q(t)

0

(6)

m̂j 0 (t) is complex-valued, and its instantaneous
amplip
tude, phase and frequency are ||m̂j 0 (t)|| = I 2 (t) + Q2 (t),
Q(t)
d6 m̂j 0 (t)
6 m̂j 0 (t) = tan−1 (
) and Ω̂j 0 (t) =
, respecI(t)
dt
tively.

(b) Correlation coefficients of pesudo noise
Fig. 1. Property of pesudo noise extraction

Please be noted that discrepancies exist between m̂j (t) and
m̂j 0 (t). Even if the wireless channel effect at receiver j and
j 0 are different, we assume that an SDR receiver could still
capture the effect of each wireless device’s frequency band
processing chain, Ci (x), to recognize them.
B. Feature extraction
For protocol-agnostic device recognition, we need to remove
message-correlated part ri (t) from m̂j 0 (t). In this way, we
ensure that our device recognition mechanism is protocolagnostic. In addition, we only use the first 1,024 samples of
m̂j 0 (t).
1) Pesudo Noise Extraction: Suppose we have derived
the numerical sequence of instantaneous metrics (amplitude,
phase, or frequency), corresponding procedures are as follow:
Step 1: We separate the sequence (denoted as sj 0 (n)) into
several non-overlap segments, with each segment’s
duration less than one symbol duration.
Step 2: For each segment, we perform k-medoids algorithm
on signals instantaneous phase or amplitudes with
k = 2. In essence, we use a clustering algorithm
to associate numeric values to their closest medoids
(representative values). Notably, we could only expect
one or two possible choices of amplitudes or phases.
Step 3: In each segment, we generate the pesudo-noise as:
nj 0 (n) = sj 0 (n) − mk [sj 0 (n)]

(7)

Where mk denotes the medoid of sj 0 (n), We subtract rationale signals from the demodulated baseband
signals directly.
A brief comparison of related signals is in Figure 1a. Medoids
could be regarded as a less noisy version of demodulated
baseband signals m̂j 0 (t).
The distribution of correlation coefficients (derive from
10,000 samples) of pseudo-noise against corresponding baseband signals is depicted in Figure 1b. The pseudo-noise signals
are weakly correlated with original messages.
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a dense layer L2 without bias, respectively. Then, Equation
(9) becomes:

Results

Y2 = W2 Y1 = W2 W1 X + W2 b1

L2
Y1

W1

W2

Y2

Where W1 and b1 belong to L1 and W2 belongs to L2 ,
respectively. Note that Equation (10) and (9) are performing
equivalent transforms to X and should not degrade the network performance. Moreover, in L2 , we can rewrite the matrix
calculation into vectors:

b1

Activated by Relu function

(10)

Outputs

Direct pass through

Fig. 3. Data flow of zero-bias dense layer.

Y2 [y1k ] = [w21 · y1k , w22 · y1k , ..., w2n · y1k ]

2) Frequency domain features: We subtract the Fourier
Transforms of both complex-valued baseband signals m̂j 0 (t)
and the reconstructed rationale baseband signals to extract
message uncorrelated residual components in the frequency
domain, formulated as:
δj (ω) = F F T [m̂j 0 (t)] − F F T [rj 0 (t)]

(8)

where rj 0 (t) is the reconstructed rational baseband signal.
Please be noted that m̂j 0 (t) is complex-valued (QPSK) while
rj 0 (t) can be real-valued (2FSK, 2PSK and etc.). We convert
residual components into a magnitude sequence (||δj (ω)||),
namely Mag.-Freq. residuals, and a phase sequence (6 δj (ω)),
namely Phase-Freq. residuals, respectively.
C. Zero-Bias Deep Learning Framework for Accurate Identification of IoT Devices
In this subsection, we present our enhancement to conventional neural networks, which is generalizable to other neuralclassification problems.
The architecture of Deep learning enabled classifier for
device identification is given in Figure 2. Convolutional layers
with skip connections are employed to extract latent features,
we also use a dense layer followed by a softmax layer for final
classification. However, in the last dense layer, we propose a
modified approach.
Suppose we have m-dimension input vectors with batch size
k, we need to convert them into k n-dimension outputs. A
conventional dense layer would perform a linear calculation
as:
Y1 = W1 X + b1

(9)

where X, b1 and W1 denote the m by k input matrix,
bias neurons and an n by m weights matrix, respectively. If
we break the regular dense layer into two consecutive parts,
depicted in Figure 3, a regular dense layer denoted by L1 and

(11)

Where w21 , ..., w2n are row vectors corresponding to n
output classes, y1k is one of the k column vectors in batch,
and Y2 [y1k ] is the output vector. The process in equation (11)
can be rewritten using Cosine Similarity:
w2n · y1k = ||w2n || · ||y1k || · cos(w2n , y1k )

(12)

If L2 is followed by a Softmax layer and we take
w21 , ..., w2n as fingerprints of classes 1 to n, we conclude that
L2 actually calculates a scaled version of cosine similarities
among input against fingerprints of target classes.
Moreover, we can safely generalize this discovery to understand the behavior of last dense layers in neural networks:
Remark 1 (Property of dense layers). If an output vector of a dense layer represent the degrees of confidence
of corresponding class/position against an input, then each
confidence degree is jointly controlled by the magnitude of
the class/position-related fingerprint, the fingerprint’s cosine
similarity to the input, and the bias neuron of this class.
Although the magnitude of an input feature vector ||y1k ||
seems to take effect as in Equation (12), but in the consecutive
Softmax layer, the magnitude ||y1k || only contributes to a
common base number as in Equation (13):
exp[||y1k || · ||w2n || · cos(w2n , y1k )]
class = P
n exp[||y1k || · ||w2n || · cos(w2n , y1k )]

(13)

Where the base number, exp ||y1k || only controls the steepness of the monotonic mapping curve According to Remark 1,
we can derive another important remark:
Remark 2 (Neural networks’ partiality). As long as prior
layers do not converge to constant functions, A neural network’s partiality to specific classes is encoded in its last dense
layer before Softmax, and the bias is jointly controlled by
the magnitude of class-related fingerprint vector and the bias
neuron of the corresponding class.
In our proposed paradigm of dense layer without bias
neurons, we can derive more specific corollaries:

Feature extraction

Convolutional layers

Pesudo noise

The last dense layer
or zero-bias layer

Softmax

Results

Mag.-freq. residuals
Raw signals

Phase-freq. residuals

Novelty detection
Direct pass through
Activated by Relu function

Fig. 2. Deep neural architecture for wireless transmitter identification.

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. 11, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2020

5

y
1

1

x

2
4
6
8
10

0.5

0

2

4

6

8

10
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Class A features
Class B features
Class x features

Fingerprint A
Fingerprint B
Fingerprint X

Fig. 4. Relation of fingerprint vectors and feature vectors.

Corollary 1 (Fingerprints’ magnitude). If the variance of the
magnitude of fingerprints vectors is small, the layer L2 has
less bias to specific classes.
Currently, we have two approaches to remove the unwanted
effects of fingerprint vectors’ magnitudes:
• We can use regularization to eliminate the variance of
fingerprints, we make their values relative close;
• We can replace Equation (11) with Equation (14):
w21
w2n T
Y2 = [ q
, ..., q
] [y11 , ..., y1k ]
(14)
2
2
w21
w2n
Moreover, we can eliminate the side effects of feature
vectors’ magnitude at the same time:
w21
w2n T y11
y1k
Y2 = λ[ q
, ..., q
] [q
, ..., q
] (15)
2
2
2
2
w21
w2n
y11
y1k
Where λ is a trainable value to provide the freedom of
controlling the steepness of the mapping curve in the
Softmax layer. Please be noted that Y2 s are differentiable
in these two scenarios and Equation (14) is still equivalent
to linear operations.
We eliminate the classifiers’ partiality or bias. We treat the
possibility of each class equally and it’s the essence of ”zerobias” dense layer. With the zero-bias enhancement, we have
corollary 2:
Corollary 2 (Fingerprints’ mutual distances). Fingerprints in
the zero bias dense layer (L2 ) act as angular representatives of
corresponding classes and should has sufficiently small mutual
cosine similarities.
A simplified example of corollary 2 is given in Figure 4,
suppose we have three classes (A, B, and X) for a deep
neural network to distinguish from, the fingerprint vector of
each class only captures a representative direction. With this
property, we only need to insert or remove fingerprints in L2 ,
to register or remove corresponding classes.
Another benefit is to evaluate how well different classes are
mutually distinguishable from each other. We can construct a
Fingerprint Distance (FD) matrix as:


cos(w1 , w1 ) . . . cos(w1 , wn )


..
..
..
FD = 
(16)

.
.
.
cos(wn , w1 ) . . .

cos(wn , wn )

2
4
6
8
10

0.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

(b) After 10 epoches

Fig. 5. Fingerprint distance matrix of Minst example

This matrix can directly reflect how well different classes
are separated in the latent space. We replace the last dense
layer with zero-bias dense layer (contains both L1 and L2 )
in the MNIST example [27] and plot the FD matrices when
training accuracy reaches 60.2% and 95.8%, respectively. As
in Figure 5, fingerprints are distantly separated with higher
accuracy.
In this subsection, we propose a new scheme of creating
zero-bias neural networks and a thorough analysis of the mechanism of dense layers. A summary of our the enhancement is:
Remark 3 (Zero-bias layer enhancement). We replace the last
dense layer of a neural network with a consecutive structure
consisting of a regular dense layer (L1 ) and a zero-bias
similarity comparing layer (L2 ).
We notice that some researches directly employ Equation
(15) as cosine similarity [28], [29] in deep learning, we
differentiate from them as: a) we provided a mathematically
equivalent transform, by using another regular fully connected
layer L1 . b) our experiments show that directly applying cosine
similarity without L1 dramatically increases the difficulty of
training.
D. Novel device identification
A wireless device identification system needs to identify
anomalous signals from novel devices. In a conventional neural
network, the Softmax layer associates labels to the largest
activation. Such behavior would result in wrong answers given
falsified signals from unknown devices. Suppose that the zerobias layer enhancement in Equation (15) is applied, the output
of the layer directly represent cosine similarities. We define
the concept Similarity Response as:
Definition 1 (Similarity response). For an input, the maximum
value in output vector after zero-bias or regular dense layer
is defined as its similarity response.
An unknown device with false identity can be detected if its
signals’ similarity reponses are below a reasonable threshold.
For example, if the similarity response of known devices
follows a Gaussian distribution, N (mk , σk ), an input with the
highest similarity less than mk − σk can be subject to novel
or even spoofing device.
V. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
[30], which accurately observe and track air traffic, is a fundamental safety infrastructure modern aviation. This system is
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designed to be simple and widely adaptable but it’s extremely
vulnerable to identity spoofing attacks. In this section, we
present our performance evaluation results using real ADSB data and demonstrate how our proposal could be elegantly
applied in practical systems.
A. Evaluation dataset
Nowadays, Commercial aircraft are equipped with dedicate
1090MHz transponders to broadcast its geo-coordinates, velocities, altitudes, headings as well as their unique identifiers,
a.k.a International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) IDs.
Such signals provides a great variety of signals from known
wireless devices. In our data collection pipeline depicted in
Figure 6, we used a modified gr-adsb library to decode ADS-B
messages and store raw baseband digital signals. We collected
the ADS-B signal from more than 140 aircraft at Daytona
Beach international airport (ICAO: DAB) for 24 hours (Jan
4th , 2020) using a Software-Defined Radio receiver (USRP
B210). The receiver is configured with a sample rate of 8
MHz. During this period, more than 30,000 ADS-B messages
are collected with coordinates and SNR (in colors) depicted
in Figure 7.
B. Known device verification
We first conduct a general performance test of the system (depicted in Figure 2). As depicted, the deep learning
model can associate received signals with accuracy greater
than 94.3%. Furthermore, a brief comparison of DNN with
proposed zero-bias layer, regular dense layer and only cosine
similarity before softmax2 on the same dataset is given in
Figure 8. As depicted, DNNs with zero-bias layer or regular
dense layer reach almost identical performance. However, the
zero-bias layer requires more training iterations, and its rising
rate of accuracy is lower at the beginning. Interestingly, if we
only use cosine similarity directly after convolutions, the deep
learning system can not converge.
2 Similar network architecture with cosine similarity and softmax directly
after convolution filters.

Fig. 9. Validation accuracy in terms of training data size for each transmitter.

To evaluate the deep learning model in terms of training data
quantity, we manually limit the number of samples of each
transmitter in the training set and use this specially ”reduced”
training set to train the zero-bias DNN model. As depicted in
Figure 9, the model converges after 800 iterations (40 epochs)
and show that we only need 200 samples to recognize each
transmitter.
C. Novel Device Identification
We randomly pick ADS-B signals from 30 aircraft to train
the neural network and use signals from the remaining 120
aircraft as unseen novel devices’ signals. We compare the
performance of our zero-bias layer, regular dense layer, and
one-class Support Vector Machine (SVM), respectively. In this
subsection we define the optimal decision boundary as:
maxτ ||cdf (Pu (τ )) − cdf (Pk (τ ))||

(17)

where Pu (τ ) and Pk (τ ) are probability distribution functions
of similarity response of unknown and known devices. cdf (·)
denotes the cumulative density function.
1) Zero-bias and regular dense layer: We employ the
zero-bias layer (use Equation (15)) for final output. The
probability distribution and decision thresholds are given in
Figure 10a and 10d, respectively. Figure 10a demonstrates that
the similarities response of unknown signals are higher than
unknown signals in most cases. Figure 10d shows that we can
easily select an optimum separation threshold to maximize
the decision boundary of the anomaly detection algorithm.
In our application, we choose the median value of similarity
responses on known signals minus its standard deviation as a
decision threshold.
We train the an identical neural network but with the zerobias layer replaced by regular dense layer. But the anomaly
detection performances are much worse, as depicted in Figure 10b and 10e, the similarity response of regular dense layer
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Fig. 10. Performance of Threshold based anomaly detections

on known and unknown data are severely overlapped. The
optimal decision boundary in this scenario is small.
2) One-class SVM: We use the feature vectors in training
signals (directly produce by convolutional layers) of zerobias DNN to train a one-class SVM model, we then use
feature vectors from validation set as unseen signals to test
the performance of one-class SVM. We collect the prediction
scores on both known signals and unknown signals with
statistic results presented in Figure 10c and 10f, respectively.
The result indicates that the prediction scores of known
devices’ signal occupy a much wider area (larger variance),
which may cause difficulty for choosing the right threshold.
The fact indicates that performance of the zero-bias layer
enabled DNN in anomaly detection is comparable with oneclass SVM. However, in our experiment, the one-class SVM
model ultimately stores more than 5,000 support vectors,
while the zero-bias layer only stores directional fingerprints
of known aircraft transponders (less than 200). Therefore, we
believe our solution is more adaptable for real-time machine
learning.
VI. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel deep learning framework
for IoT device identification. Different from existing works, we
focus on how to enable deep learning to be practically usable
and dependable. Our contributions are as follows: Firstly, we
analyze the mathematical essence of IoT device identification
and use residual signals to identify real-world ADS-B transmitters. We got a promising recognition rate of 94% among
more than 130 airborne transponders. Secondly, we thoroughly
analyze the behavior of the last fully-connected layer in deep
neural networks and propose our improvement, the zero-bias
layer, for interpretable and dependable machine learning in
IoT. Experiments show that we obtain equivalent accuracy
compared to the regular deep neural network, but obtain much
better performances in terms of anomaly detection. Therefore,
we believe the zero-bias layer can be generalized to other
domains, such as virus detection or unsupervise intrusion
detection. In the future, we will focus on how to efficiently

discover reusable function blocks in pre-trained networks and
apply them to new domains.
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